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The Federal Judiciary-Inflation, Malfunction, 
and a Proposed Course of Action 
Daniel J. Meador* 
Though not recognized annually, September 24, the birth- 
day of the federal judiciary, is an important date in American 
history. On that date in 1789, President Washington signed the 
first Judiciary Act.' That Act created the system of federal 
courts that, with a few significant changes, exists today. The Su- 
preme Court and the district courts that the Act established still 
remain. 
Although Congress has made many statutory alterations 
concerning the federal courts since that time, three changes 
stand out as truly significant. The first was the 1875 statute giv- 
ing the federal trial courts, for the first time, general jurisdiction 
over cases arising under federal law and greatly enlarging the 
jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases.' The second-and 
the most significant structural change-was the introduction of 
a tier of intermediate appellate courts through the Evarts Act of 
l89LS Our present-day U.S. Courts of Appeals descend from 
that Act. The third change was a jurisdictional rearrangement 
flowing from the creation of those new appellate courts. The re- 
sult was a shift, through the Judges' Bill of 1925: of the Su- 
preme Court's appellate jurisdiction to a largely discretionary 
basis. Broadly speaking, the federal judiciary in 1981 is the sys- 
tem established by the Act of 1789, modified by these later 
changes. 
As we move into the 1980's, the present judicial system, like 
the national economy, is beset with near runaway inflation. The 
inflation is of two sorts. One is inflation in the business of the 
courts, an explosive increase in the quantity of cases being filed 
* James Monroe Professor of Law, University of Virginia. This Article is adapted 
from a paper presented at a conference on the federal courts sponsored by the American 
Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C., on October 1, 1980. 
1. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 
2. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137 18 Stat. 470. 
3. Ch. 517, 25 Stat. 826 (1891). 
4. Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936 (1925). 
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and litigated. The other is inflation in the number and variety of 
personnel within the judicial branch. The inflation in personnel 
has been caused by, and is in response to, the inflation in 
caseloads. Dangerous consequences may follow, just as they may 
in a period of unrestrained economic inflation, if the inflation in 
caseloads and personnel remains unchecked or if measures are 
not adopted to equip the judiciary to function soundly under 
these altered circumstances. 
The inflation in judicial business is well known and well 
documented. It began in the early sixties and was rolling in high 
gear by the advent of the seventies. It continues unabated. The 
year 1960-roughly two decades ago-is a convenient point from 
which to measure the magnitude of growth. Measured against 
that base year, case filings, civil and criminal, in the federal dis- 
trict courts increased 110% by 1979.' Dispositions in those 
courts increased 93% .6 Filings in the courts of appeals increased 
a staggering 419%.' Dispositions in those courts increased 
410% .8 In the Supreme Court in the 1978 Term there were 4,731 
cases on the docket: an increase of more than 150% over the 
1959 Term.lo Over this same period of time the number of cases 
disposed of by full opinion rose from 9711 to 153.12 
There is another aspect to the inflation of caseloads that is 
difficult to quantify yet real in the view of participants and ob- 
servers. This is the increase in the complexity of the courts' bus- 
iness. Today, as compared to 1960 and earlier, there are more 
"large" cases in terms of numbers of parties, issues, and stakes. 
5. [I9791 DIRECTOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 4-7 [hereinafter 
cited as 1979 ANN. REP.]. In 1960, 59,284 civil cases and 29,828 criminal cases were com- 
menced in federal district courts. In 1979, 154,666 civil cases and 32,688 criminal cases 
were commenced in federal district courts. 
6. Id. In 1960, 61,829 civil cases and 29,864 criminal cases were terminated in fed- 
eral di'strict courts. In 1979, 143,323 civil cases and 33,411 criminal cases were terminated 
in federal district courts. 
7. Id. at  3. In 1960, 3,899 appeals were commenced, while in 1979, 20,219 appeals 
were commenced. In fiscal year 1980, filings in the courts of appeals climbed to 23,200, 
an increase of 14.7% over the previous year. THIRD BRANCH, Oct. 1980, at 8. 
8. 1979 ANN. REP., supra note 5, at 3. In 1960, 3,713 cases were terminated; in 1979, 
18,928 cases were terminated. 
9. Id. at A-1. 
10. [I9601 DIRECTOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 66 [hereinafter 
cited as 1960 ANN. REP.]. During the October Term, 1959, there were 1,862 cases dock- 
eted in the Court. 
11. Id. 
12. 1979 ANN. REP., supra note 5, at A-1. The number cited refers to those cases 
disposed of by full opinion in the October 1978 Term. 
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The issues are also more difficult and complex. At the same 
time, there is also a greater volume of routine, even trivial busi- 
ness, unfamiliar to the federal judiciary in past decades. 
Inflation in judicial personnel is readily documented, al- 
though perhaps not widely known. The inflation in judgeships, 
though significant, is perhaps not radical considering the rise in 
business and the growth in population of the country. In 1960 
there were 226 federal district judgeships;13 in 1980 there were 
516," a growth of 128%. In 1960 there were 68 courts of appeals 
judgeships; in 1980 there were 132, a growth of 94%.lS 
The most dramatic personnel inflation has been the rise in 
number, variety, and status of officials within the judiciary who 
are not Article I11 judges. There were 174 bankruptcy referees in 
1960;" there are now 236 bankruptcy "judges."17 Prior to 1968 
there were no federal magistrates. By 1979 there were 196 full- 
time magistrates and 292 part-time magistrates serving in the 
district courts.18 The number of law clerks serving the Article I11 
judges rose from 264 in 19601@ to 697 in 1979,"O an increase of 
164%. In 1960 there were no staff attorneys in the appellate 
courts; there are now 136." Today there are 10 circuit execu- 
t i v e ~ . ~ ~  Prior to 1971 this position did not exist. Overall, in 1960 
there were 5,562 persons employed in the judicial branch of the 
federal g~vernment;~~ in 1979 there were 12,563," an increase of 
126 % .2s 
There are virtually no signs of a tapering off or decline in 
the volume of judicial business. All indications point toward 
continued increases. Since 1970, in every year except fiscal year 
1978, filings in the courts of appeals have increased."' Filings in 
13. 1960 ANN. REP., supra note 10, a t  85. 
14. 1979 ANN. REP., supra note 5, at 7. 
15. Id. a t  3. 
16. 1960 ANN. REP., supra note 10, a t  163. 
17. 1979 ANN. REP., supra note 5, at 23. 
18. Id. at 128. The 292 figure represents 271 part-time and 21 "combination" posi- 
tions. Magistrates replaced the part-time commissioners, who served prior to 1968. 
1s. 1960 ANN. REP., supra note 10, a t  205. 
20. 1979 ANN. REP., supra note 5, at 22. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. 1960 ANN. REP., supra note 10, at 205. Supreme Court personnel are exluded. 
24. 1979 ANN. REP., supra note 5, a t  22. 
25. More detailed information on the growth of personnel in the federal judiciary 
can be found in Meador, The Federal Judiciary and Its Future Administration, 65 VA. 
L. REV. 1031 (1979). 
26. 1979 ANN. REP., supra note 5, a t  43. 
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the district courts since 1970 have increased every year except 
fiscal year 1973." Every year, Congress enacts statutes that give 
rise to fresh litigation. It is difficult to find any statute enacted 
by Congress in the last decade that reduces or eliminates any 
significant category of litigation. Few, if any, would predict that 
Congress will cease to legislate or will legislate to eliminate any 
sizable clump of cases. Moreover, the Supreme Court continues 
to hand down decisions opening up new avenues into the federal 
courts, either by the recognition of new substantive rights of ac- 
tion or by holdings on such threshold access questions as stand- 
ing, ripeness, and mootness. The American people are uncom- 
monly litigious, and present conditions in our society are not 
likely to diminish this trait. It seems highly probable that the 
volume of business handled by the federal courts will continue 
to increase year by year. 
One possibility for a significant reduction in workload lies in 
the curtailment of the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction of the 
district courts. Bills to this effect have been under serious con- 
sideration in Congress since 1977." Since then the House of 
Representatives has twice passed a bill to eliminate the general 
diversity jurisdiction,'@ but the Senate has not yet acted favora- 
bly on any such measures. Apart from this proposal, however, 
there is not pending any serious measure that would reduce sig- 
nificantly the intake of business into the federal judiciary. 
Throughout the history of the federal judiciary, the volume 
of litigation has risen and fallen numerous times. A graph of the 
growth of business from 1789 to the present would not be a 
steady upward line; it would have peaks and valleys. But we 
have now exceeded all previous peaks and are on a steady up- 
ward line, bound for even greater heights. No comprehensive 
plan is before the country that would enable the judiciary to 
meet the conditions that threaten stability and uniformity in 
federal law. 
27. Id. at  4-7. 
28. See, e.g., S. 679, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 2202, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1979); H.R. 1046, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 130,96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 
2389, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 2094, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 1613, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 10050, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 9622,95th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 9308,95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 9123, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1977); H.R. 7243, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 761, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
29. H.R. 10050,95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 9622,95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
On Oct. 4, 1978, the Senate incorporated the text of H.R. 9622 into its pending measure, 
S. 1613. The House approved the bill, as amended by the Senate, the same day. 
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The major response thus far has been the addition of per- 
sonnel. Adding judges is an obvious and understandable re- 
sponse to sustained growth in caseloads. Congress has taken this 
step many times throughout our history, most recently in 1978..O 
A significant new twist is the addition of non-Article 111 person- 
nel, as mentioned above. Providing more personnel for the 
courts can of course equip them to deal with a greater quantity 
of business and thereby overcome delay in adjudication, one of 
the major evils of caseload inflation. However, adding judges at  
the appellate level creates in turn another serious problem: a 
heightened difficulty in maintaining a nationally uniform body 
of federal law. This threat to uniformity is one of the major 
problems now afaicting the federal judiciary. Its solution lies in 
restructuring or rearranging the judiciary at the appellate level. 
In this respect, the present period resembles that quarter 
century from the close of the Civil War to the passage of the 
Evarts Act in 1891. Thus it may be useful, or at least interesting, 
to look briefly at the conditions in the federal courts at that 
time, the efforts to equip the courts to function under those con- 
ditions, and the step eventually taken by Congress. 
The period beginning in the 1860's and culminating with 
the creation of the courts of appeals a quarter century later in 
1891 presents interesting parallels to the period commencing in 
the 1960's. Then, as now, the federal judiciary was buffeted by 
changes in the nation-economic, political, and social-and by 
an enlarged jurisdiction. And then, as now, these altered circum- 
stances posed great difficulties for the judiciary because it was 
not structured to deal with the new conditions. Ultimately the 
remedy lay in a new judicial structure-the insertion of the in- 
termediate appellate courts-the very part of the system where 
the greatest structural deficiencies are being experienced now. 
With the close of the Civil War, large economic forces were 
unleashed across the United States, leading to industrialization, 
the development of the transcontinental rail system, and enor- 
mous growth in commercial activity over the remainder of the 
30. Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (codified at 5 
U.S.C. $ 5108; 28 U.S.C. 5 s  41 note, 44, 44 note, 45 note, 46, 133, 133 note, 1337, 1445) 
(1976 & Supp. 111 1979). This Act added 35 courts of appeals judgeships and 117 district 
court judgeships, the largest single increase in the history of the judiciary. 
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nineteenth century." This growth gave rise to substantial in- 
creases in litigation. Moreover, new federal legislation was en- 
acted under which new kinds of legal controversies arose. New 
litigation also stemmed from the aftermath of the War and from 
Reconstruction measures. 
The dockets of the federal trial courts and the Supreme 
Court climbed rapidly in the postwar years. The rising tide of 
federal litigation increased even more in 1875 with the enact- 
ment of the statute authorizing the federal trial courts, for the 
first time, to entertain cases generally arising under the constitu- 
tion, laws, and treaties of the United States.s2 Liberalized re- 
moval provisions also contributed to the swelling of federal 
dockets," as did an expansion of the diversity of citizenship ju- 
risdiction to include any suit between citizens of different 
states." The Supreme Court's docket doubled and then doubled 
again in the two decades before 1880." The period, like the pre- 
sent, was one of an unprecedented increase in judicial business 
at all levels. 
It was obvious that a serious problem existed, but no solu- 
tion could be agreed upon. Beginning in the mid-1860's the idea 
of creating appellate courts, organized on the existing circuit ba- 
sis, was persistently suggested and debated. With no consensus 
forming over that idea, Congress, in 1869, created the new posi- 
tion of circuit judge and authorized the appointment of one such 
judge for each of the nine circuits? Although the circuit judges 
had some appellate functions as members of the circuit courts, 
the main effect of this measure was to enhance judicial man- 
power at the trial level. The new judgeships did nothing to re- 
lieve the Supreme Court's business or to provide any significant 
increase in terms of system-wide appellate capacity. 
I t  became increasingly evident that the most serious prob- 
lem afaicting the system was insufficient appellate capacity. A 
suggested solution during the 1870's and 1880's was to enlarge 
the Supreme Court in various ways and to authorize it to sit in 
sections or panels. This idea competed with the proposal to cre- 
31. This recapitulation of the events leading to the Circuit Courts of Appeals Act is 
drawn largely from F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 
56-102 (1927). 
32. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. 
33. Id. 3 1. 
34. Id. 33 2-4, 6, 7. 
35. 13 CONG. REC. 3464 (1882) (remarks of Sen. Davis). 
36. Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44. 
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ate permanent intermediate appellate courts. In 1875 Congress 
restricted Supreme Court review of admiralty cases and in- 
creased the monetary minimum of civil cases on appeal from the 
circuit courts from $2,000 to $5,000.s7 This measure afforded 
some relief, but it did not reach the fundamental problem, 
namely, that a single appellate court sitting over the entire fed- 
eral judicial system simply could not hear and decide a sutticient 
volume of appeals. 
The culminating efforts to solve the problem began in the 
late 1880's. Attorney General Augustus H. Garland actively en- 
tered the fray, strongly recommending the creation of intermedi- 
ate appellate courts.38 His successor as Attorney General, Wil- 
liam H. Miller, continued to press this proposal.s9 The new 
President of the United States, Benjamin Harrison, was suB- 
ciently persuaded of the seriousness of the problem to recom- 
mend, in his first message to Congress in 1889, the creation of 
the intermediate appellate courts.'O Senator William J. Evarts of 
New York, who had previously been attracted to the idea of en- 
larging the Supreme Court, became converted to the intermedi- 
ate appellate court idea and assumed congressional leadership of 
the movement. A committee of the American Bar Association 
also supported the idea and worked with Senator Evarts in de- 
veloping the specific bill? 
As the bill worked its way through the two houses of Con- 
gress, there were the usual compromises and reshaping to meet 
the various interests. The most significant and unfortunate com- 
promise was the agreement in Congress, largely as the result of 
pressures from the bar, to leave the old circuit courts intact. 
Thus the system was left with the oddity of two separate kinds 
of courts at  the trial level. This was a price that had to be paid 
in order to enlist adequate support for the new intermediate ap- 
pellate courts. The bill passed and was signed into law by the 
37. Act of Feb. 16, 1875, ch. 77, 18 Stat. 315. 
38. [I8871 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. XV; [I8881 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. xiv. 
39. [I8891 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. xviii-xix; [I8901 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. xviii-xix. 
40. Benjamin Harrison, First Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 3, 1889), reprinted 
in MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 5467 (1897). 
41. Committee on Judicial Administration and Remedial Procedure, Report, 17 
A.B.A. REP. 336,337 (1894). The ABA Committee on Relief of the Supreme Court, which 
worked with Senator Evarts, consisted of David Dudley Field, Henry Hitchcock, Francis 
Rawle, J. Randolph Tucker, George H. Bates, Edward Otis Hinkley, William Allen But- 
ler, Thomas J. Semmes, J. Hubley Ashton, and Walter B. Hill. 13 A.B.A. REP. 95 (1890). 
624 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I981 
President on March 3, 1891.42 The bill created a court of appeals 
in each of the existing nine circuits consisting of three judges, 
two of whom were permanent circuit judges. 
Another compromise was that these courts of appeals were 
not given appellate jurisdiction over all lower court decisions; in 
several categories of cases, appeals would still lie directly to the 
United States Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the new courts of 
appeals were given jurisdiction over a sizable proportion of all 
federal appeals.4s 
The new courts brought immediate and substantial relief to 
the Supreme Court. Thus, this structural innovation in the fed- 
eral judicial system proved to be the appropriate remedy for the 
radical influx of litigation that had been going on for a quarter 
century. Restructuring of the system was not complete, however, 
until two later congressional enactments. One came in 1911 
when the old circuit courts were finally abolished," despite con- 
tinued opposition from leading lawyers.46 This step left the 
United States District Courts as the sole trial forums in the fed- 
eral judicial system. The next reform came in 1925 with the so- 
called Judges' Bill that gave the Supreme Court a large measure 
of discretionary jurisdi~tion:~ with almost all appeals from the 
district courts routed initially to the courts of appeals. No signif- 
icant structural or jurisdictional alterations have occurred since 
1925. 
The federal judiciary today is, of course, far larger than it 
was a hundred years ago, or even fifty years ago, and its 
problems are likewise larger. However, the major problem is sim- 
ilar in that it is structural and can thus be met, as it was ulti- 
mately met in 1891, only by some structural alterations. Like- 
wise, as in the period of a hundred years ago, numerous 
solutions for the current difficulties have been presented and de- 
bated. Are we now facing another ten years of debate, as our 
predecessors faced in 1881, or can we galvanize ourselves into 
action more quickly than that? 
42. Evarts Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891). 
43. Id. $$ 5-7. 
44. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, 8 289, 36 Stat. 1087. 
45. 46 CONG. REC. 298-300 (1910). Opposition to the abolition of the circuit courts 
was led by Hollis R. Bailey, Joseph H. Choate, James Buchanon, Charles D. Merrick, 
Alex W. Smith, John D. Rouse, George D. Lancaster, James Quarles, Otto Raymond 
Barnett, James H. Matheny, Ralph W. Breckenridge, and C.E.S. Wood, all members of 
the ABA. 
46. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936. 
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During the quarter century before 1891, interest in restruc- 
turing the federal judiciary centered largely in Congress. At the 
present time, however, concerns about judicial problems have 
been much more widespread. Various nongovernmental groups 
and individuals, as well as Congress, have worked to develop 
new structural and jurisdictional arrangements that would en- 
able the federal courts to function more effectively in contempo- 
rary circumstances. The major efforts since the late 1960's are 
described below. 
American Law Institute. The first effort launched since 
1960 was the study by the American Law Institute on the juris- 
diction of the federal courts. It was initiated in response to a 
suggestion by Chief Justice Earl Warren, made in an address to 
the Institute in May 1959." The study was completed in 1968, 
and the results were published in a book entitled Division of Ju- 
risdiction Between State and Federal Courts.48 
The basic categories of jurisdiction-federal question and 
diversity of citizenship-were preserved, but with certain adjust- 
ments. The aim was to realign state and federal jurisdiction in a 
rational and contemporarily useful way. The entire set of pro- 
posals was introduced into Congress" and has been pending 
there ever since. Hearings have been held at various times:O but 
the proposals have not advanced beyond the committee level in 
either house. 
American Bar Foundation. The American Bar Foundation 
initiated a study which represented the first effort to deal specif- 
ically with the worsening federal appellate court problem. The 
results of the study were published in 1968 in a report entitled 
Accommodating the Workload of the United States Courts of 
Appeals." The report recommended several internal arrange- 
47. Address by Chief Justice Earl Warren to the 36th Annual Meeting of the Ameri- 
can Law Institute (May 20, 1959), reprinted in 36 ALI PROCEEDINGS 27-43 (1959). 
48. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN 
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (1968). 
49. S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 
50. Federal Court Jurisdiction Act of 1971: Continuation of Hearings on S. 1876 
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciary 
Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Federal Court Jurisdiction Act of 1971: Hearings on 
S. 1876 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate 
Judiciary Comm., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 
51. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, ACCOMMODATING THE WORKLOAD OF THE UNITED 
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ments and procedures that would enable the intermediate appel- 
late courts to function more effectively. It recommended no ba- 
sic restructuring or jurisdictional rearrangements. However, the 
report posed several suggestions for further consideration, in- 
cluding the splitting of circuits and the creation of a "National 
Circuit," using rotating circuit judges to resolve intercircuit 
A significant by-product of this study was an article written 
by the project director, Professor Paul Carringt~n.'~ The most 
important suggestion in the article was that the dockets of the 
courts of appeals be divided along' subject matter lines and allo- 
cated among panels on that basis? The objective was to intro- 
duce greater stability into the law of the circuit. 
The Freund Committee. The next effort was the Report of 
the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court." The 
study group was known informally as the Freund Committee af- 
ter its Chairman, Professor Paul Freund of the Harvard Law 
School. Appointed under the auspices of the Federal Judicial 
Center, the committee was charged with the mission of studying 
the Supreme Court's workload and recommending measures for 
handling that workload more effectively. The Report made sev- 
eral recommendations, including the elimination of three-judge 
district courts and the Supreme Court's obligatory jurisdiction." 
Its most controversial proposal was to create a new court known 
as the "National Court of  appeal^."'^ 
This proposed new court would have no permanent judges 
of its own but would consist of seven U.S. Circuit Judges sitting 
for staggered three-year terms. Its major function would be to 
receive and screen all certiorari petitions and appeals. It would 
funnel approximately 400 to 500 cases to the Supreme Court an- 
nually, from which that Court would select approximately 200 
for hearing and decision on the merits. The National Court of 
Appeals could retain cases of genuine circuit conflict for deci- 
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS (1968). 
52. Id. at 6-8. 
53. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the 
Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542 (1969). 
54. Id. at 587-96. 
55. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF
THE SUPREME COURT (1972). 
56. Id. at 47. 
57. Id. at 18-25. 
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sions on the merits.s8 
The Report had a peculiar fate in that the proposal for a 
National Court of Appeals leaked to the press prior to publica- 
tion. The proposal encountered vociferous opposition from influ- 
ential judges and other parties." The new court was seen by 
many as diluting the authority of the Supreme Court. Some also 
objected to depriving litigants with important questions of direct 
access to that Court. Unfortunately, the proposal was thought 
by some critics to be a covert attack on the Supreme Court. 
Whatever the reason, the proposal for this new appellate court 
was stillborn. The Report was significant, however, in that it fo- 
cused nationwide attention on federal appellate problems. It also 
clarified some of the political limits on proposals for the restruc- 
turing of appellate courts. 
The Hruska Commission. In 1972 Congress created the 
Commission on the Federal Court Appellate System, chaired by 
Senator Roman Hruska. The commission, the most important 
governmental effort of the period concerning the courts, con- 
sisted of four members of the Senate, four members of the 
House of Representatives, four persons appointed by the Chief 
Justice, and four persons appointed by the President. It had a 
full-time staff and held extensive hearings in various parts of the 
country. Its first report in 1973 recommended a division of the 
Fifth and Ninth C i r ~ u i t s . ~ ~  Its second report, submitted in 1975, 
dealt with structure and internal operating procedures at  the ap- 
pellate leveP 
The commission's most important and highly publicized 
recommendation was the creation of a "National Court of Ap- 
58. Id. 
59. See, e.g., Black, The National Court of Appeals: An Unwise Proposal, 83 YALE 
L.J. 883 (1974); Brennan, The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U .  CHI. 
L. REV. 473 (1973); Goldberg, One Supreme Court, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 10, 1973, at 14; 
Gressman, The National Court of Appeals: A Dissent, 59 A.B.A.J. 253 (1973); Lay, Why 
Rush to Judgment? Some Second Thoughts on the Proposed National Court of Ap- 
peals, 59 JUDICATURE 173 (1975); Poe, Schmidt, & Whalen, A National Court of Appeals: 
A Dissenting View, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. (1973); Address by Earl Warren to the Meeting of 
the Assoc. of the Bar of the City of New York (May 1, 1973), reprinted in part in 59 
A.B.A.J. 721, 724 (1973). 
60. COMMISSION O REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, THE GEO- 
GRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE SEVERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUITS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
CHANGE (1973). 
61. COMMISSION O  REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE 
AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1975). 
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peals"" by Congress. Though bearing the same name, this court 
had little or no resemblance to the court proposed by the 
Freund Committee. The proposed court would be inserted be- 
tween the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, with a case- 
deciding function and no certiorari-screening function. The 
court would consist of seven permanent Article I11 judges and 
would sit only en banc. Cases would be received in two ways-by 
reference from the Supreme Court and by transfer from the ex- 
isting U.S. Courts of Appeals, the Court of Claims, and the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. Any case decided by the 
new court would be reviewable by the Supreme Court on 
certiorari. 
The Hruska Commission proposals were introduced 
promptly into Congress," where they remain pending. The pro- 
posal to divide the Fifth Circuit has been adoptedr but there is 
no prospect of early action concerning the Ninth Circuit. The 
proposal to create a National Court of Appeals has received lit- 
tle congressional attention thus far, although it has been the 
subject of discussion in legal literature? 
Advisory Council on Appellate Justice. This nongovern- 
mental body was created in 1971 to act as an advisor on appel- 
late matters to the Federal Judicial Center and to the National 
Center for State Courts. Chaired by Professor Maurice Rosen- 
berg, it consisted of thirty members, including judges, lawyers, 
and law professors. Over a four-year period it considered a vari- 
ety of problems concerning both state and federal appellate 
courts. The council developed a set of considerations that should 
govern the creation of any new federal appellate court or any 
restructuring at the federal appellate level? These and other 
62. Id. at  8. 
63. 's. 2763, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 2762, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 
11,219, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 11,218, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 
64. The bill passed the Senate in June 1980. S. 2830, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). 
H.R. 7645,96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). After this paper was presented, Congress enacted 
the bill dividing the Fifth Circuit, creating a new Eleventh Circuit. Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452,94 Stat. 1994 (to be codified at  
28 U.S.C. 55 1, 41). 
65. See, e.g., Hruska, The National Court of Appeals: An Analysis of Viewpoints, 9 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 286 (1975); Swygert, The Proposed National Court of Appeals: A 
Threat to Judicial Symmetry, 51 IND. L.J. 327 (1976); Comment, An Intermediate Na- 
tional Appellate Court: Solution or Diversion?, 22 VILL. L. REV. 1022 (1977). In July 
1981, Sen. Howard T. Heflin introduced S. 1529, a bill to create a National Court of 
Appeals similar to that proposed by the Hruska Commission. 
66. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON APPELLATE JUSTICE, Recommendation for Improving the 
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recommendations were made available to the Hruska Commis- 
sion. They were then discussed at the National Conference on 
Appellate Justice in 1975, sponsored by the Advisory C o u n ~ i l . ~ ~  
In part, the principles devised by the council would support the 
creation of a new court along the lines of the Hruska Commis- 
sion proposal. 
American Bar Association. Through its Special Committee 
on Coordination of Judicial Improvements and ultimately 
through House of Delegates action, the American Bar Associa- 
tion developed a position generally supporting the proposal of 
the Hruska Commission to create a National Court of Appeals, 
but with jurisdiction limited to cases referred to it by the Su- 
preme 
Individual Judges and Lawyers. The above efforts in the 
early 1970's focused attention on appellate problems, particu- 
larly in the federal appellate system, to a greater extent than at 
any time since the years preceding the Act of 1891, and perhaps 
as never before in the history of the American judiciary. As a 
result, appellate problems were the focus of discussion within 
various bar groups, at  conferences, and in legal literature. Mem- 
bers of the judiciary who contributed to the debate included 
Federal Circuit Judges Friendly:. Haynsworth,lo Huf~tedler ,~~ 
McGowan,12 Leventhal,ls Aldisert,14 Bell," Rosenn,16 Rubin,l7 
Federal Intermediate Appellate System, in 4 MATERIALS FOR A NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
ON APPELLATE JUSTICE 163 (1975). 
67. Id.; ADVISORY COUNCIL ON APPELLATE JUSTICE, Expediting Review of Felony 
Convictions After Trial, in 3 MATERIALS FOR A NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON APPELLATE JUS- 
TICE 34 (1975); ADVISORY COUNCIL ON APPELLATE JUSTICE, National Court Development, 
in 4 MATERIALS FOR A NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON APPELLATE JUSTICE 202 (1975); ADVISORY 
COUNCIL ON APPELLATE JUSTICE, Reports and Recommendations on Improvements of 
Appellate Practices, in 5 MATERIALS FOR A NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON APPELLATE JUSTICE 
127 (1975). 
68. SUMMARY OF ACTION TAKEN BY THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION 4 (Feb. 1976). 
69. See H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION (1973); Friendly, Averting the Flood by 
Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL . REV. 634 (1974). 
70. See Haynsworth, Improving the Handling of Criminal Cases in the Federal Ap- 
pellate System, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 597 (1974); Haynsworth, A New Court to Improve 
the Administration of Justice, 59 A.B.A.J. 841 (1973). 
71. See Hufstedler, Courtship and Other Legal Arts, 60 A.B.A.J. 545 (1974). 
72. See Remarks by Carl McGowan to the National Conference on Appellate Justice 
(Jan. 23-26, 1975), reprinted in WTERIAL FOR A NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON APPELLATE 
JUSTICE (1975). 
73. See Leventhal, Appellate Procedures: Design, Patchwork, and Managed Flexi- 
bility, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 432 (1976); Leventhal, A Modest Proposal for a Multi-Circuit 
Court of Appeals, 24 AM. U .  L. REV. 881 (1975). 
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and Lay,18 as well as state appellate judges." Numerous law 
professors and others also contributed to the interchange?O 
From a restructuring standpoint, one of the most significant 
suggestions to appear in the literature was the proposal for a 
National Court of Criminal  appeal^.^' That court would hear 
and decide all criminal appeals from the United States District 
Courts and would entertain state criminal cases involving fed- 
eral questions. The Supreme Court would exercise certiorari ju- 
risdiction over the decisions of this new court. 
The Department of Justice Committee. At the Sixth Cir- 
cuit Judicial Conference in 1975, President Gerald Ford spoke 
on the problems and needs of the federal courts.82 Pursuant to 
that Presidential interest, Attorney General Edward Levi ap- 
pointed a committee within the Department of Justice, chaired 
by then Solicitor General Robert Bork, to survey the problems 
74. See Aldisert, Appellate Justice, 11 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 317 (1978). 
75. See Bell, Toward a More Efficient Federal Appeals System, 54 JUDICATURE 237
(1971). 
76. See Rosenn, Trends in Administration of Justice in the Federal Courts, 39 
OHIO ST. L.J. 791 (1978). 
77. See Rubin, Views from the Lower Court, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 448 (1976). 
78. See Lay, Reconciling Tradition with Reality: The Expedited Appeal, 23 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 419 (1976). 
79. E-g., Cameron, The Central Staff: A New Resolution to an Old Problem, 23 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 465 (1976); Cameron, National Court of State Appeals: A View from 
the States, 65 A.B.A.J. 709 (1979); Hopkins, Reviewing Sentencing Discretion: A 
Method of Swift Appellate Action, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 491 (1976); Hopkins, Small 
Sparks from a Low Fire: Some Reflections on the Appellate Process, 38 BROOKLYN L. 
REV. 551 (1972). 
80. See, e.g., P. CARRINGTON, D. -OR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 
(1976); Betten, Institutional Reform in the Federal Courts, 52 IND. L.J. 63 (1976); 
Bright, The Changing Nature of the Federal Appeals Process in the 1970Ds, 65 F.R.D. 
496 (1975); Cramton, Federal Appellate Justice in  1973, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 571 (1974); 
Finley, The Appellate System: On a Vulnerable Plateau, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1971, at 19; 
Hazard, Standards of Judicial Administration: Appellate Courts, 62 A.B.A.J. 1015 
(1976); Leflar, Appellate Judicial Innovation, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 321 (1974); Meador, Ap- 
pellate Case Management and Decisional Processes, 61 VA. L. REV. 255 (1975); Robin- 
son, Proposal and Analysis of a Unitary System for Review of Criminal Judgments, 54 
B.U. L. REV. 485 (1974); Rosenberg, Enlarging the Federal Courts' Capacity to Settle 
the National Law, 10 GONZ. L. REV. 709 (1975). 
81. See Haynsworth, Improving the Handling of Criminal Cases in the Federal Ap- 
pellate System, 59 CORNELL . REV. 597 (1974); Haynsworth, A New Court to Improve 
the Administration of Justice, 59 A.B.A.J. 841 (1973). A broader proposal for a court 
that would review both criminal and civil appeals was suggested by Chief Justice Cam- 
eron. Cameron, National Court of State Appeals: A View from the States, 65 A.B.A.J. 
709 (1979). 
82. The President's Remarks at a Breakfast for Participants Attending the Confer- 
ence on Mackinac Island, Mich., 11 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOC. 745-47 (July 13, 1975). 
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and develop recommended solutions. The committee completed 
its work in 1976.83 
The committee recommendations included proposals to cre- 
ate a set of administrative law tribunals, possibly with trial and 
appellate divisions, manned by Article I judges? These courts 
would provide judicial review for a multitude of administrative 
actions under federal regulatory laws in fields such as health, oc- 
cupational safety, social security, labor, and environmental pro- 
te~tion.~' If implemented, this proposal would divert from the 
existing federal courts some 20,000 or more cases annually. 
The committee reasserted the Freund Committee's recom- 
mendation that the Supreme Court's obligatory jurisdiction be 
eliminated:' and it recommended abolishing diversity of citizen- 
ship jurisdiction." The committee recommended the creation of 
a permanent interbranch Council on Federal Courts to work on 
continuous planning and coordinating improvements in the judi- 
~ i a r y . ~ ~  However, the committee did not favor the creation of a 
National Court of  appeal^.^^ 
Given the original Presidential impetus, the committee's re- 
port presumably would have served as the basis for an adminis- 
tration program to be urged upon Congress if President Ford 
had been elected in 1976. However, it was not until January 
1977, a few days before the inauguration of President Carter, 
that the report appeared in print and became public. Because of 
this timing, the report unfortunately received little public atten- 
tion, although several of the recommendations were pursued vig- 
orously by the Carter administration. 
Ofice for Improvements in the Administration of Justice. 
The last effort of the decade, outside of Congress and the courts, 
was initiated by Attorney General Griffin Bell. Shortly after he 
took office in late January 1977, he established, as a new unit 
within the Department of Justice, the Office for Improvements 
in the Administration of Justice (OIAJ).OO This Office embodied 
the idea that the Department of Justice be committed perma- 
83. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COMMITTEE ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYS- 
TEM, THE NEEDS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (1977). 
84. Id. at 9.. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 12. 
87. Id. at 15. 
88. Id. at 16. 
89. Id. at 18. 
90. 42 Fed. Reg. 8140 (1977). 
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nently, through a continuously functioning office, to justice sys- 
tem studies and improvements. Attorneys General from the be- 
ginning of the government have made proposals from time to 
time for improving the federal judiciary. As mentioned earlier, 
Attorneys General Garland and Miller were active in the late 
1880's in the effort to bring about the establishment of the inter- 
mediate appellate courts. But until 1977 there was never an of- 
fice with a mandate to work continuously on the entire range of 
the justice system, to identify its problems, and to recommend 
solutions. The former Office of Policy and Planning had dealt 
primarily with problems within the criminal justice field. 
During the two years following its creation, OIAJ developed 
and attempted to promote in Congress, on behalf of the Depart- 
ment of Justice and the administration, several proposals to im- 
prove the federal judiciary. The earliest of the OIAJ proposals 
was a bill to enlarge the civil and criminal jurisdiction of federal 
magistrates. That proposal was designed to augment judicial 
manpower at  the trial level. The bill was enacted in late 1979.@l 
OIAJ also developed a bill carrying forward the recommen- 
dations of the Freund Committee and the Levi-appointed Jus- 
tice Department committee to eliminate the Supreme Court's 
obligatory j~risdiction.~~ The latter committee's recommenda- 
tion to abolish the general diversity jurisdiction was also en- 
dorsed in the Congres~ .~~ The Office also developed proposals 
aimed at improving the administration of the federal judiciary 
by reducing the size and altering the composition of the Judicial 
Councils of the circuits and requiring the courts of appeals to 
appoint advisory committees to assist them in formulating rules 
of practice and internal operating pro~edures .~ 
91. The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643 (amending 
28 U.S.C. 55 631-636, 604(d)(3), 1915 (1976); 18 U.S.C. 5 3401 (1976)). 
92. Supreme Court Jurisdiction Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 3100 Before the Sub- 
comm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (statements and discussions of Wade H. McCree, Jr., and Daniel 
J. Meador). The measure passed the Senate in 1979. S. 450,96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 
93. Diversity of Citizenship JurisdictionlMagistrates Reform-1979: Hearings on 
H.R. 1046 and H.R. 2202 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Ad- 
ministration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 133 
(1979) (statement of Daniel J. Meador); Federal Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction: 
Hearings on S. 2094, S. 2389 and H.R. 9622 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in 
Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 
(1978) (statement of Daniel J. Meador). 
94. S. 677, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 
1979: Hearings on S. 677 and S. 678 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial 
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The most significant idea developed in OIAJ concerning the 
appellate courts was the proposal to create a new intermediate 
appellate court. The court would be known as the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. This new court would 
be brought about by a fusion of the Court of Claims and the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. The new court would 
have jurisdiction over all of the appellate business now handled 
by those two courts and, in addition, would have nationwide ju- 
risdiction over all appeals from the district courts in patent 
cases as well as a few other kinds of cases. The proposal also 
included the creation of a new Article I forum known as the 
United States Claims Court. This court would handle the trial 
business of the present Court of Claims." That proposal passed 
the Senate in 19799'jand passed the House in 1980.97 The bills 
contained minor differences, however, and the proposal died in 
conference in late 1980. It was reintroduced in 1981. 
All of these proposals, formulated by OIAJ and endorsed by 
the Attorney General, were incorporated into a Presidential 
message to Congress on February 27, 1979.98 The legislative pro- 
posals accompanying that message had been worked out col- 
laboratively by OIAJ with key staff personnel of the Senate Ju- 
diciary Committee and the House Judiciary Subcommittee. The 
proposals were announced by President Carter at a White House 
press briefing attended by the Attorney General and members of 
the Senate and House Judiciary  committee^.^^ 
Thus, by the close of the decade, significant proposals 
designed to place the federal judiciary in a more effective posi- 
tion had received Presidential backing and were part of an ad- 
ministration program for congressional action. A similar devel- 
opment likely would have occurred had the Ford administration 
remained in office, in view of the interest voiced by President 
Ford and carried forward by the committee appointed by Attor- 
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 35, 71 (1979) 
(statement of Daniel J. Meador). 
95. The proposal is discussed in the Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Judicial Con- 
ference of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (May 9, 1979), re- 
printed in 84 F.R.D. 429,465-89; Haworth & Meador, A Proposed New Federal Inter- 
mediate Appellate Court, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 201 (1978). 
96. S. 1477, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 
97. H.R. 3806, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). 
98. 15 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOC. 342-46 (Feb. 27, 1979). 
99. 15 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOC. 340 (Feb. 27, 1979). 
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ney General Levi.loo 
That committee's recommendation that a Council on Fed- 
eral Courts be created was sought to be implemented by OIAJ. 
However, after discussions among representatives of OIAJ, the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, the House Judiciary Committee, 
Vice President Mondale's Office, and the judiciary, the conclu- 
sion was reached that the formal creation of such a body was 
probably not feasible any time soon. As a result of those discus- 
sions, however, representatives from the three governmental 
branches met in Williamsburg, Virginia in early 1978. They have 
met there every year since that time in a seminar-style gathering 
under the aegis of the Brookings Institution. Representatives at 
these sessions discuss currently pending legislation concerning 
the courts, as well as problems of the judiciary that may be the 
subject of future legislation. Although informal and unofficial, 
these annual sessions provide a means of communication among 
the three governmental branches concerning the judiciary. 
Congressional Activity. Although congressional action may 
seem small in relation to the magnitude of the judiciary's 
problems and the efforts of the last dozen years, it has not been 
insignificant. Congress created the Federal Judicial Center in 
1968 to provide a research and educational arm for the federal 
courts.lol The Center's budget has been regularly increased over 
the years since then. Currently the budget is in excess of eight 
million dollars. lo2 The Act initiating the federal magistrate sys- 
tem was also passed in 1968.loS Congressional activity over the 
next several years was devoted to hearings on the ALI propos- 
als,lM the creation of the Hruska Commission,10s and to hearings 
on circuit splitting.lo6 
Congressional concern with federal judicial problems en- 
tered a new phase in 1977. Beginning early that year, in the first 
session of the 95th Congress, the two subcommittees of the Sen- 
100. See text accompanying notes 82-83 supra. 
101. Act of Dec. 20, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-219, 81 Stat. 664 (codified at 28 U.S.C. $5 
611, 620-29 (1976)). 
102. 1979 ANN. REP., supra note 5, at 35. 
103. Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (codified at 28 
U.S.C. $5 631-639 (1976)). 
104. See hearings cited at note 50 supra. 
105. Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 806. 
106. Circuit Realignment: Hearings on S. 2988, S. 2989, and S. 2990 Before the 
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1974). 
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ate and House Judiciary Committees charged with jurisdiction 
over courts stepped up congressional attention on these matters. 
In the Senate, the Judiciary Subcommittee on Improve- 
ments in Judicial Machinery acquired a new chairman, Senator 
Dennis DeConcini of Arizona. During the next two years, that 
subcommittee was the center of Senate interest regarding court 
problems. Much of the subcommittee's agenda was worked out 
in collaboration with the Office for Improvements in the Admin- 
istration of Justice. In addition, other measures were developed 
within its own staff and with the staff of the Judiciary Commit- 
tee. The subcommittee held hearings on the bills to expand mag- 
istrate jurisdiction,lo7 to limit or abolish diversity of citizenship 
jurisdiction,108 to eliminate the Supreme Court's obligatory juris- 
diction,lO@ to authorize court-annexed arbitration in the district 
courts,l1° to create the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit,ll1 the U.S. Claims Court, and the U.S. Court of Tax Ap- 
peals, and numerous other measures aimed at improving the 
federal judiciary. 
In the House, the Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Civil 
Liberties, and the Constitution, chaired by Representative Rob- 
ert W. Kastenmeier of Wisconsin, approached these problems by 
first holding exploratory hearings on the justice system in the 
spring of 1977. Numerous individuals testified about the needs 
and problems of the federal courts and the administration of 
justice generally.l12 Then, during the next two years the subcom- 
mittee held hearings on the magistrate bill,lla the diversity of 
107. Magistrate Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 1612 and S. 1613 Before the Subcomrn. 
on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 95th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1977). 
108. Federal Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction: Hearings on S. 2094, S. 2389, 
and H.R. 9622 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the 
Senate Judiciary Comm., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). 
109. See hearings cited at note 92 supra. 
110. The Court-Annexed Arbitration Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 2253 Before the 
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judici- 
ary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). 
111. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 677 and S. 678 
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1979: 
Addendum to Hearings on S. 677 and S. 678 Before the Subcomrn. on Improvements in 
Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 
112. Hearings on the State of the Judiciary and Access to Justice Before the Sub- 
comm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Judi- 
ciary Comm., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
113. See hearings cited at note 93 supra. 
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citizenship bills,l14 and the bill to create the U.S. Court of Ap- 
peals for the Federal Circuit and the U.S. Claims Court.l15 
In addition to the activities in these House and Senate sub- 
committees, the Senate Judiciary committee, in early 1979, 
launched consideration of a package of proposals, consisting of 
already pending measures plus an array of new ideas to improve 
the federal courts.116 The carryover measures included the bills 
on diversity jurisdiction117 and magistrates.ll8 New proposals 
concerned the organization of the circuit Judicial Councils11@ 
and the creation of a U.S. Court of Tax Appeals,120 U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit,lm and U.S. Claims Court."' All 
of these measures, except the proposal for a Tax Court of Ap- 
peals, had just been endorsed by the President in his message of 
February 27, 1979.1aS 
Despite the many hearings and the considerable efforts of 
governmental and nongovernmental groups throughout the 
19707s, Congress passed only three significant bills to equip the 
federal judiciary to deal with contemporary conditions: the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,124 the Omnibus Judgeship Act 
of 1978,12' and the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979.1U These all 
came near the end of the decade. Collectively, these measures 
enable the federal judiciary to adjudicate a larger number of 
cases within more reasonable periods of time. As suggested ear- 
lier, however, the substantial addition to judicial manpower and 
the change in judicial business have resulted in a different judi- 
cial system than existed just a few years ago. 
114. Id. 
115. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Act of 1980: Hearings on H.R. 
3806 Before the Subcornm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice 
of the House Judiciary Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). H.R. 3806 passed the House 
on Sept. 15, 1980 and the bill was sent to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Sept. 
17. The Senate committee discharged the bill and placed it on the Senate Calendar on 
Sept. 30, 1980. 
116. See hearings cited at note 111 supra. 
117. S. 2389, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). 
118. S. 237, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 
119. S. 678, 96th Cong., 1st Sew. 3 121 (1979). 
120. Id. $ 401. 
121. Id. $ 301. 
122. Id. $ 311. 
123. 15 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOC. 342 (Feb. 27, 1979). 
124. Pub. L. No. 95-598,92 Stat. 2549 (to be codified in scattered sections of 11, 28 
U.S.C. (Supp. I1 1978)). 
125. See note 30 supra. 
126. See note 91 supra. 
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Judicial Actions. In addition to the changes wrought by the 
recent legislation, significant changes have been brought about 
within the courts during the past decade by the judges them- 
selves. These have altered radically the way in which the busi- 
ness of the federal courts is conducted. The judges have intro- 
duced new management techniques at both trial and appellate 
levels. Computerization has made much headway. Some of the 
most striking changes have come within the courts of appeals 
through new internal operating procedures, the use of central 
st& attorneys, and the screening and tracking of appeals. These 
and other steps, which allow a substantial percentage of cases to 
be decided through expedited processes, have changed the face 
of the judiciary as compared to that in the mid-1960's and have 
enabled the courts to avoid disastrous breakdowns threatened 
by ever-rising case filings. 
Although the legislation recently enacted by Congress is 
helpful in adding to the resources of the judiciary and in work- 
ing a modest restructuring at the trial level, these enactments, 
combined with the actions taken by the judges, fall short of 
placing the judiciary in a position to deal effectively with its 
contemporary business. In particular, the problems of lack of 
uniformity in federal law are not ameliorated by these measures. 
Since congressional action is necessary to overcome the most s i e  
nificant deficiencies in the court system, we must understand 
the impediments to such action if meaningful results are to be 
achieved. 
The impediments to congressional action stem from a vari- 
ety of circumstances briefly described below. Any one of these 
poses difficulties for the proponents of court improvement legis- 
lation; in combination they are formidable. 
Congressional Priorities, Attention, and Time. The Ameri- 
can Congress is beset in the late twentieth century with an al- 
most endless list of problems, demands, and challenges. These 
range from trivial matters to questions of national and global 
significance. They concern energy, national defense, disarma- 
ment, tax reform, medical care, education, immigration, and so 
on. Courts, the justice system, and related problems are also on 
the agenda. But the congressional agenda is filled with so many 
issues perceived to be of greater and more urgent importance 
that most members of Congress-indeed, all but a tiny hand- 
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ful-find courts far down on their list of priorities. They simply 
do not have the time or the inclination to focus on long-range 
problems concerning the judiciary. Their attention is dispersed 
over so many matters and is claimed by so many other demands 
that Congress as a whole finds it difficult to give the judiciary 
the kind of attention necessary to bring about significant 
reforms. 
Lack of Influential Political Constituencies. An effectively 
functioning court system is everybody's business. There are few 
matters of greater general public importance. However, the sub- 
ject is not one around which there has coalesced any influential 
political constituency that prompts Congress to act, as in other 
areas such as labor, welfare, taxation, medical care, education, 
agriculture, and so on. There are, of course, groups interested in 
judicial improvements, but they are relatively small and lack po- 
litical clout. Thus judicial problems are not brought to the at- 
tention of Congress by the extensive lobbying efforts employed 
by other important interest groups.lm This circumstance, in 
part, contributes to the priority problems already discussed. 
The relative weakness of court reform interests in the politi- 
cal arena also makes it difficult to activate the President on this 
subject. Thus, court improvement bills pending in Congress sel- 
dom attract strong support from the administration. 
Special Interest Opposition. Although there are no special 
interest groups of political magnitude affirmatively supporting 
court reform efforts, there are numerous special interest groups 
that will promptly rise in opposition to such efforts. Many of the 
influential political constituencies have watchdog services that 
pick up the slightest proposal to alter structure, jurisdiction, or 
procedure of the courts in any way that might arguably have 
some adverse impact upon their special interests. When that cir- 
cumstance is coupled with the lack of an effective constituency 
affirmatively pressing for court reform, the result is predictable: 
no action by Congress. The totality of the circumstances-more 
urgent and pressing national priorities, lack of affirmative con- 
stituencies pushing reform, and special interests ready to rise in 
127. To provide a formal means of communicating the judiciary's concerns to the 
Congress, a proposal has been made for several years to invite the Chief Justice to ad- 
dress periodically a joint session. A bill embodying this idea passed the Senate in 1980. 
S. 2483, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). Hearings were held in the House on Sept. 19, 1980. 
Hearings on H.R. 6597 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin- 
istration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). 
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opposition-makes it difficult for any significant court reform 
measure to attract the serious attention of Congress and to pro- 
gress through the legislative labyrinth. 
Lawyer and Bar Negativism. Although a few individual law- 
yers have, at various times in American history, including the 
present, exercised significant leadership roles in bringing about 
court improvements, such individuals are an infrequent minor- 
ity. Likewise, although bar organizations occasionally support 
court reform efforts,128 such support is unusual. The dominant 
attitude among individual lawyers and among the organized bar 
is either indifference or negativism regarding proposals to alter 
existing structure, jurisdiction, or procedure.12@ 
There appear to be several reasons for this indifference or 
negativism. One is simple inertia-the understandable human 
disinclination to alter a known and comfortable existing arrange- 
ment. Although this tendency is natural, it seems more preva- 
lent among lawyers than among other breeds of mankind. An- 
other reason for the negativism relates to the specialization of 
the bar. Today, to a far greater degree than in past decades, law- 
yers tend to concentrate in areas of the law where they represent 
distinct groups of clients. Consequently, lawyers tend to react to 
matters in terms of their clients' interests, rather than as inde- 
pendent, detached, and professional observers. A lawyer with a 
128. E.g., Hufstedler & Nejelski, A.B.A. Action Commission Challenges Litigation 
Cost and Delay, 66 A.B.A.J. 965 (1980) (The ABA Action Commission to Reduce Court 
Costs and Delay was established to promote experimental procedures to expedite litiga- 
tion and to make it less expensive.); Report of the Special Comm. on Coordination of 
Judicial Improvements, 101 A.B.A. Rw. 350 (1976) (The ABA supported the adoption 
by Congress of S. 2762, a bill for the establishment of a National Court of Appeals, 
except as it related to transfer jurisdiction; in February 1974 the House of Delegates had 
adopted a resolution supporting in principle the creation of a new appellate court.). 
129. This atmosphere is not easy to document because it is not always reflected in 
published material. A recent example that can be documented is the opposition of cer- 
tain groups of trial lawyers to measures aimed at limiting or abolishing the diversity of 
citizenship jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hearings on Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction/ 
Magistrate Reform 1979 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Ad- 
ministration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 
(1979) (statement of John C. Shepherd); Hearings on Federal Diversity of Citizenship 
Jurisdiction Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Sen- 
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1978) (statement of John P. 
Frank); Hearings on Diversity of Citizenship JurisdictionlMagistrate Reform Before 
the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1977) (statement of Robert G. 
Begam). Leading members of the American bar opposed abolition of the US. Circuit 
Courts in the early 20th century long after they had ceased to serve any useful purpose. 
See note 45 supra. 
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truly general practice does not have this problem to the same 
degree. Because by definition he represents all types of clients 
from all walks of life, no particular client or class of clients 
claims any special lock on his thoughts, time, or income. Conse- 
quently, general practitioners may think more objectively about 
what may be good for the system, but such lawyers are now few. 
A final possible explanation for lawyer indifference or nega- 
tivism has to do with the lawyers' own economic interests. 
Sometimes proposals for court improvement are seen as threat- 
ening those interests. They may either diminish the lawyers' 
practice in some way or make their practice economically less 
rewarding. Whatever the reasons, when almost any proposal for 
a significant change in the courts is advanced, numerous lawyers 
and bar associations can be expected to come forward in 
opposition. 
Lack of Continuity of Program and Effort. Another impedi- 
ment to congressional action is the lack of continuity in the pro- 
grams and efforts to reform the judicial system. This, in large 
part, is a result of all of the foregoing circumstances. Two factors 
make it unlikely that any well-developed program of reform will 
be pressed with continuity of effort over a sufficient period of 
time to bring it to fruition: the lack of congressional time and 
attention, because of other more urgent priorities, and the lack 
of an affirmative political constituency pushing for court reform. 
Such efforts as there are tend to be sporadic and aimed at  rela- 
tively narrow, specific aspects of the court system, rather than at 
broad, system-wide problems. Even when an extensive, well- 
thought-out proposal is presented to Congress, continuity af ef- 
fort seems to be lacking. Interest, organization, and resources are 
insufficient to maintain an impetus behind the proposal long 
enough for it to pass both Houses of Congress. 
An additional reason why few of the significant judicial pro- 
posals of the last decade have been enacted may be the lack of 
consensus in American society about important public questions. 
The rise of single interest groups and the political fragmentation 
evident during the past decade probably interfere with the de- 
velopment of a coherent body of opinion concerning solutions to 
the courts' problems. 
Despite these circumstances militating against significant 
court reform enactments in Congress, we cannot simply abandon 
efforts to equip the judiciary to cope with inflation and malfunc- 
tion. We must devise a course of action that takes the impedi- 
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ments into account and is designed to achieve results despite 
them. Before thinking about courses of action to be pursued, 
however, we need to identify more precisely the problems of the 
federal judiciary on which attention should primarily be focused. 
IV. PRIORITIES 
At any given time, a host of matters concerning jurisdiction, 
procedure, and management of the courts could profit from 
study and change. Continuous efforts to improve the judiciary in 
all respects should of course be maintained. However, given the 
limitations on congressional time and on available resources 
within the bench and the bar, we must avoid dispersing effort 
over too large an array of matters. Instead, we should give prior- 
ity to the most pressing system-wide problems, the resolution of 
which would most significantly aid the judiciary in administering 
justice under law. The chief objective should be to provide 
sound, expeditious adjudication and to maintain a high degree of 
nationwide uniformity in federal law. 
The federal judicial system is malfunctioning primarily be- 
cause the existing structure is not designed to handle contempo- 
rary business effectively. The problem is one of judicial architec- 
ture. A court system is like a building. As years pass, as the 
nature of the building's business changes, and as the t rafh pat- 
terns are altered, the structure needs to be remodeled, reno- 
vated, or perhaps even rebuilt. The courts are no different. 
Structures are not created for all time. We create what seems to 
be best in light of the circumstances of the day, but we do so 
with the realization that conditions change.lS0 Lord Macauley 
wisely observed that it is necessary to reform in order to pre- 
serve. One can change consistently with enduring principles. In- 
deed, the principles are unlikely to be kept alive and vigorous 
unless reforms are instituted from time to time. Today, as in the 
1880's, we have come to a point where architectural modification 
of the system is needed at the appellate level. That should be 
assigned first priority. 
Intermediate Appellate Court Restructuring. A natural re- 
sponse to the sowing quantity of judicial business is to add 
judges to the courts. That response is based on analogies to 
other situations in which an increase in business tends to over- 
130. "[Glreat judiciary acts, unlike great poems, are not written for all time." F. 
FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 107 (1927). 
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load existing personnel. For example, as the number of custom- 
ers attracted to a bank grows, the existing tellers' windows be- 
come insufficient to receive the increased volume of deposits and 
checks. A reasonable response is to increase the number of win- 
dows. To a considerable extent, this analogy holds true for trial 
courts. Adding trial judges will equip a trial court to handle a 
greater volume of cases. Apart from providing a sufficient num- 
ber of courtrooms and clerical personnel, there is no serious in- 
stitutional difficulty with that approach. Each trial judge is an 
autonomous decisionmaking entity. He sits alone, hears matters 
by himself, and renders independent decisions. The trial judge 
conducts adjudicative business essentially the same, whether the 
particular court has three judges or a hundred judges. 
In an appellate court, the situation is significantly different. 
Appellate judges rarely, if ever, sit alone. Appellate decisions are 
rendered collegially. Thus, the addition of judges to an appellate 
court does not necessarily increase the court's capacity or effi- 
ciency, unless the court is divided so that it does not sit as a 
single decisional unit. This is what has been done in the US. 
Courts of Appeals and in other large appellate courts. Each U.S. 
Court of Appeals now sits in multiple panels of three. The only 
potential gain in adding appellate judges is to increase the num- 
ber of three-judge decisional units within each circuit. This step 
increases the capability of the court to decide more appeals and 
thereby to cope with the problem of quantity. 
But here we see an illustration of a phenomenon often en- 
countered in judicial reform: a step taken to alleviate one prob- 
lem sometimes creates other, equally troubling problems. In- 
creasing the number of decisional units to meet the growth in 
quantity threatens uniformity, evenhandedness, and stability in 
the application of law. The most stable, certain, and predictable 
appellate arrangement would be a court composed of perma- 
nently assigned judges, all of whom sit on each appeal. The far- 
ther we move away from that model, the greater the risk of erod- 
ing those qualities. Multiple decisional units within a single 
appellate jurisdiction risk the creation of a judicial Tower of 
Babel. 
For years following the creation of the U.S. Courts of Ap- 
peals in 1891, there were only two circuit judges in each of the 
federal judicial circuits. Both sat on virtually all appeals in the 
circuit, with either a Supreme Court justice or a district judge 
sitting as the third member of the panel. As judicial business has 
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grown in the twentieth century, the number of judges provided 
for each circuit has increased. However, the system of sitting in 
three-judge panels has continued. As the number of circuit 
judges grew, each court of appeals began to hear appeals in vary- 
ing and shifting panels of three?' Although this practice intro- 
duced elements of uncertainty, as long as the court did not con- 
sist of more than six or seven judges, the level of uncertainty 
was not intolerable. Moreover, if there were no more than nine 
judges, a court of appeals could occasionally hold an en banc 
hearing to iron out any uncertainties or unevenness resulting 
from the use of multiple three-judge panels. 
The federal judicial system has now reached the stage where 
the number of appellate decisional units risks serious uneven- 
ness and uncertainty within each circuit and between the cir- 
cuits. Since passage of the Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, the 
Ninth Circuit has consisted of twenty-three judges. The Fifth 
Circuit consisted of twenty-six judges prior to its division on Oc- 
tober 1, 1981.182 Eight circuits now exceed nine judges in size.lS8 
As the likelihood of differing interpretations and applica- 
tions of federal law has increased, the efficacy of an en banc pro- 
cedure to iron out intern4 circuit variations has greatly dimin- 
ished. When an appellate court exceeds nine judges, it is widely 
believed that the en banc procedure is more cumbersome, less 
likely to be employed, and less productive of a coherent, colle- 
gial decision. Whatever might be the optimum number for an en 
banc body, it is clear that a single court of twenty-three or 
twenty-six judges makes a mockery of a judicial proceeding. The 
Fifth Circuit sat en banc several times after it was authorized 
twenty-six judgeships. An examination of some of the en banc 
opinions produced by that body suggests that it ceased to be the 
kind of appellate tribunal to which the Anglo-American legal 
system has been accustomed. Opinions were issued by clumps of 
judges, as though they were members of a convention or a legis- 
131. 28 U.S.C. 5 46(c) (1976 & Supp. I11 1979). 
132. The Circuit was divided, effective October 1, 1981, into the Eleventh Circuit, 
consisting of Alabama, Georgia, and Florida, and the Fifth Circuit, consisting of Missis- 
sippi, Louisiana, and Texas. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, 
Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. 85 1, 41). 
133. District of Columbia Circuit, 11 judges; First Circuit, 4 judges; Second Circuit, 
11 judges; Third Circuit, 10 judges; Fourth Circuit, 10 judges; Fifth Circuit, 14 judges; 
Sixth Circuit, 11 judges; Seventh Circuit, 9 judges; Eighth Circuit, 9 judges; Ninth Cir- 
cuit, 23 judges; Tenth Circuit, 8 judges; Eleventh Circuit, 12 judges. 
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lative body instead of an appellate ~ 0 u r t . l ~ ~  
In a court of nine judges there are 84 possible combinations 
of three; in a court of fifteen judges there are 455 such combina- 
tions; in a court of twenty-three judges there are 1,771 possible 
groups of three. The diminished efficacy of the en banc proceed- 
ing, along with the greatly increased number of decisional units, 
places an enormous stress on the Supreme Court as the only 
means to iron out unevenness within each circuit as well as be- 
tween circuits. Yet the Supreme Court, consisting of nine jus- 
tices, is obviously limited in its capacity. In fact, the Supreme 
Court is simply incapable institutionally of monitoring the cur- 
rent volume of circuit court decisions. The statistics tell the tale: 
a generation or two ago the Supreme Court was reviewing up- 
ward of a third of all circuit court decisions; today the Court 
reviews less than one percent.136 
In the years prior to 1891 the systemic problem was how to 
devise a coherent appellate supervision of trial court decisions 
where the number of trial courts and the volume of their deci- 
sions had swollen enormously. The Supreme Court, as the single 
federal appellate tribunal, had been overrun; it lacked the insti- 
tutional capacity to deal with the number of appeals from the 
trial level. 
Today the problem is similar; yet there is a significant dif- 
ference. Intermediate appellate courts cieated to meet the 1891 
lack of capacity now lack a similar capacity themselves. The 
courts at that level are unable institutionally to deal with the 
134. E.g., Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1980) (22 judges: 13 on the 
majority opinion, 5 on a concurring opinion, 3 for a second concurrence, 1 in dissent); 
United States v. Dohm, 618 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir. 1980) (23 judges: 10 on the plurality 
opinion, 4 on a concurring opinion, 1 concurring in the result only, 7 concurring in part 
and dissenting in part, 1 separately concurring in part and dissenting in part); United 
States' v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980) (23 judges: 12 on the majority, 6 in a 
concurring opinion, 4 concurring in the result only, 1 separately concurring); Harryman 
v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1980) (23 judges: 8 on the plurality opinion, 3 on a 
concurring opinion, 2 on a second concurrence, 9 on a third concurrence, 1 concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
135. Hufstedler, Courtship and Other Legal Arts, 60 A.B.A.J. 545, 546-47 (1974); 
see Griswold, Rationing Justice-The Supreme Court's Caseload and What the Court 
Does Not Do, 60 CORNELL . REV. 335, 341 (1975). Between 1974 and 1976 the Supreme 
Court gave plenary consideration to between 175 and 179 cases each term. See Hellman, 
The Business of the Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act of 1925: The Plenary 
Docket in the 1970's, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1711, 1727 n.74 (1978). This compared with ap- 
proximately 15,500 and 18,400 cases filed annually in the courts of appeals during the 
same period. [1977] DIRECTOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 305, table 
B3. 
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swollen volume of appeals in a way that preserves a reasonable 
nationwide uniformity in federal law. The Supreme Court lacks 
the capacity to maintain that uniformity through its supervision 
of the intermediate appellate courts. 
The response in 1891 was to alter the federal judicial struc- 
ture by introducing an intermediate appellate level. The appro- 
priate response today is much more complicated. The solution 
proposed by the Hruska Commission is to insert still another 
tier into the judicial structure, a National Court of Appeals, be- 
tween the regional courts of appeals and the Supreme Court.lu 
Thus far, however, the idea of an additional appellate layer has 
not elicited sufficient support to pass Congress. There is reluc- 
tance to lengthen the ladder between the bottom and the top of 
the system. Nevertheless, it is possible that this may be the best 
solution, considering all of its advantages and disadvantages. 
Another approach to the problem, which has not been ex- 
tensively explored, is to employ a subject matter organization 
within the intermediate appellate tier. This type of organization 
could accommodate numerous judges within a single appellate 
court to deal with a large volume of cases. Subject matter organ- 
ization has been used for decades, apparently with sound results, 
in the appellate court system of Germany. Today in the Federal 
Republic of Germany there are appellate courts consisting of 
well over one hundred judges each?? Within each of these 
courts, docket and panel assignments are arranged along subject 
matter lines. Each of these courts is divided into groups of either 
five or seven judges, and each small group is assigned a desig- 
nated but varied mixture of cases. Typically, each group has sev- 
eral categories of cases. Even so, each group's caseload repre- 
sents a relatively small percentage of the court's docket. Under 
this system, even if the court itself has over 100 judges, there 
will be an identifiable appellate body of five, or no more than 
seven, judges who deal with a given type of case. The values of 
predictability and certainty associated with a small, fixed appel- 
late forum are preserved as to each category of case, regardless 
of the total number of judges on the court. This system makes 
136. See notes 61, 63, 65 and accompanying text supra. 
137. The numbers of judges on the German appellate courts can be derived from 
Handbuch der Justiz (1978 ed.). A description of the German appellate system is con- 
tained in HEYDE, THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
(1971). See also Meador, Appellate Subject Matter Organization-The German Design 
from an American Perspective, 5 H a s n ~ c s  INT'L & COMP. L. REV. - (1982). 
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the addition of judges and the expansion in the number of deci- 
sional entities at the appellate level far less difficult. 
Subject matter organization could be installed in the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals. In the larger circuits-those exceeding nine 
judges-the docket could be allocated among panels on a subject 
matter basis. Panels could remain intact for substantial periods 
of time, perhaps three years, with a staggered, gradual rotation. 
In any one circuit, at any one time, there would be a fixed panel 
of judges dealing with each particular type of case, but no judge 
would be confined to a single type of case. The system would 
preserve the values of stability and continuity, while avoiding 
the pitfalls of a permanent specialization for any individual 
judge. For example, in the course of a judicial career of ten or 
fifteen years, a judge would rotate through several panels and 
deal with a variety of types of cases.138 Presumably such an in- 
ternal arrangement could be established by the individual court 
of appeals or by the Judicial Conference of the United States for 
all circuits. Alternatively, the plan could be embodied in 
legislation. 
Using a subject-matter assignment system within each cir- 
cuit would reduce the number of decisional units nationwide for 
most types of cases to the number of circuits, twelve. That is a 
vast improvement over the many dozens of such units that pres- 
ently exist. However, even with twelve decisional units there will 
still be occasional inter-circuit conflicts and long delays in set- 
tling a disputed issue of federal law. For certain kinds of cases 
there is a compelling need for early resolution and a high degree 
of national uniformity. For those cases, a single appellate forum 
can be designated to entertain all appeals nationwide. For exam- 
ple, since the Second World War, Congress has created a Tem- 
porary Emergency Court of Appeals on two occasions, to deal 
with. wage and price control and energy matters, on the theory 
that there was a compelling need for nationwide uniformity.18@ 
138. The idea of subject matter organization was put forward in Carrington, supra 
note 53, and was discussed in P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON 
APPEAL 185-224 (1976). 
139. The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 204(c), 56 Stat. 31, estab- 
lished the Emergency Court of Appeals. Its jurisdiction was expanded by the Housing 
and Rent Act of 1948, ch. 161, 1 202, 62 Stat. 93 (codified at  50 U.S.C. app. 58 1884, 
1894, 1898 (1976)); and the Defense Production Act of 1950, ch. 932,64 Stat. 798 (codi- 
fied at 50 U.S.C. app. $5 2061-2166 (Supp. I1 1978)). Authority for that Emergency Court 
terminated in 1962. The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals was later established 
pursuant to the Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210,85 
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The two types of cases where the need for uniformity today 
is considered most prevalent are tax and patent cases. There 
have been recurrent suggestions to create jurisdiction in a single 
forum over tax appeals, and a bill was introduced in 1979 to es- 
tablish such a forum.140 Another pending bill would create a U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which would have na- 
tionwide appellate jurisdiction over patent cases. No doubt there 
are other categories that could be identified as special needs 
arise, and there are, of course, various ways in which a forum 
can be established to entertain such nationwide appeals. 
Two of these ways are illustrated in the currently pending 
bills. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit would be a 
permanent appellate court manned by its own circuit judges. 
The proposed tax appeals court would be a forum consisting of 
judges drawn from the existing U.S. Courts of Appeals, sitting 
by designation for terms of years and convening periodically to 
hear tax appeals. Each of these courts would be on line with the 
existing courts of appeals. 
All of the above are simply suggested approaches to resolve 
the current difficulties at the intermediate appellate level. As ex- 
plained by Professor Paul Carrington twelve years ago, the cur- 
rent situation poses a substantial threat to the national law.141 
The threat has not diminished and, indeed, is rising with the 
increase in the number of appellate decisional units and the in- 
efficacy of the en banc procedure. 
Three other problem areas in the federal judiciary require 
immediate attention. None of the three is clearly superior to the 
others. Therefore, the order in which they are set forth beIow 
does not necessarily indicate their relative importance. 
Non-Article 111 Judicial Officers and Adjuncts. As noted 
earlier, reactions to swollen caseloads have caused a sizable 
growth in the non-Article I11 personnel of the federal judiciary. 
The relative status of these judicial officers has also been height- 
ened. Bankruptcy "referees" have been converted, by the Bank- 
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978,142 into bankruptcy "judges," with 
Stat. 743 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 5 5305 note, 12 U.S.C. 5 1904 notes, 15 U.S.C. 3 1026 
(1978)); and the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. $5 751, 754 (1976)). 
140. S. 678, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); see hearings cited at note 111 supra. 
141. See Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to 
the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542 (1969). 
142. See note 124 supra. 
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additional personnel and support. The "bankruptcy court" is 
now virtually a separate court system within the federal judici- 
ary. Federal magistrates have been given broadened authority to 
try civil and criminal cases. These magistrates are, in function, 
becoming a subordinate tier of courts under the district courts. 
Central staff attorneys in the courts of appeals have grown in 
number; for example, there are now approximately thirty in the 
Ninth Circ~it."~ They perform important tasks in screening ap- 
peals, preparing memoranda on the cases, and recommending 
dispositions. These developments have raised apprehensions 
that the independence of the judiciary, the status of Article I11 
judges, and the quality of adjudication may be eroded by the 
extensive use of persons who are not Article I11 judges.lu 
At the same time, there is rising interest among students of 
judicial organizations in the use of judicial "adjuncts." These are 
professionals of various kinds within the judiciary who perform 
tasks similar to those performed in part in the past by special 
masters and receivers. In the public-law litigation that has blos- 
somed in the federal judiciary over the past two decades, ad- 
juncts have even wider roles in assisting judges to develop ap- 
propriate forms of relief and to oversee the implementation of 
judicial decrees.14' The introduction of judicial adjuncts can be 
helpful and, indeed, may be essential to enable the judiciary to 
perform adequately. But extensive use of such persons raises 
concern about the role of Article I11 judges. 
Non-Article I11 judges and adjuncts have come into the fed- 
eral system and have grown in status and responsibility without 
any overall planning about their appropriate use and the limits 
on their use. The time has come for a comprehensive canvass of 
the use of such persons. This could include the drafting of pro- 
posed legislation that would revise the use of these persons, inte- 
ga te  them more uniformly into the federal judicial structure, or 
convert some of them into Article I11 judges. 
The inquiry would also include consideration of the propo- 
sal of the Levi-appointed Justice Department committee to cre- 
143. Hellman, Central Staff in Appellate Courts: The Experience of the Ninth Cir- 
cuit, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 937 (1980); Oakley & Thompson, Law Clerks in Judges' Eyes: 
Tradition and Innovation in the Use of Legal Staff by American Judges, 67 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1286, 1294 (1979). 
144. E.g., Higginbotham, Bureaucracy-The Carcinoma of the Federal Judiciary, 
31 ALA. L. REV. 261 (1980). 
145. J. Weinberg, The Role of Judicial Adjuncts in Implementing Public Law Reme- 
dies (paper submitted to Council on the Role of Courts, Jan. 1980). 
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ate a separate set of Article I administrative law courts.lq6 These 
courts, perhaps with trial and appellate divisions, would review 
the great mass of disputes arising out of federal regulatory laws 
on such matters as health, occupational safety, social security, 
and the environment. The separate courts might absorb much of 
the present work handled by administrative law judges, whose 
role might also be included within this study."' 
In short, what is needed is a system-wide inquiry into the 
appropriate allocation of functions between Article I11 judges 
and all other non-Article I11 officers and personnel that are or 
might be involved in the adjudicative work of the nation under 
federal law. 
Availability of Federal Trial Courts for the Resolution of 
Controversies Governed by State Law. Article I11 of the Consti- 
tution gives Congress the power to determine to what extent, if 
any, the federal district courts may entertain controversies gov- 
erned wholly by state law between parties from different states. 
Congress has always authorized some measure of diversity juris- 
diction, although it was narrowly limited until 1875. The ques- 
tion of the appropriate extent of such federal trial court jurisdic- 
tion has been a matter of discussion and debate throughout 
American history.lqS In recent years serious efforts have been 
made to eliminate entirely the presently existing general diver- 
sity of citizenship jurisdiction in the district courts.14@ That ef- 
fort has wide and substantial backing, but it also encounters op- 
position from some segments of the litigating bar. Thus far that 
opposition has proven successful in blocking congressional action 
to alter diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. 
Given the political influence of certain litigating lawyers and 
the general congressional inertia on questions of court reform, 
enactment of the proposal to eliminate the general diversity ju- 
risdiction seems unlikely in the near future. Moreover, the de- 
147. For pertinent discussion, see Abrams, Administrative Law Judge Systems: The 
California View, 29 AD. L. REV. 487 (1977); Mans, Selecting the "Hidden Judiciary": 
How the Merit Process Works in Choosing Administrative Law Judges (pt. 2) ,  63 JUDI- 
CATURE 130 (1979); Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco-A Reprise, 47 U .  CHI. L. REV. 57 (1979); 
Segal, The Administrative Law Judge-Thirty Years of Progress and the Road Ahead, 
62 A.B.A.J. 1424 (1976). 
148. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1051-53 (2d ed. 1973). 
149. See note 28 supra. 
650 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I981 
bates of recent years have identified certain situations in which 
a federal district court can serve a useful contemporary function 
by providing a forum where no state court could adjudicate the 
entire controversy. The existing interpleader jurisdiction is an 
excellent e~arnp1e.l~~ Other situations that have been identified 
include the so-called "mass tort" cases. Per haps the best illus- 
tration of this is a commercial airline disaster, which may give 
rise to dozens or even hundreds of claims on behalf of persons 
residing in many states. In those situations suits typically are 
filed in many states, and there is no way to gather them all into 
a single state forum. 
In other situations no single state forum may be available 
because the cases involve multiple defendants located in several 
states. Supreme Court decisions have placed limits on the reach 
of state in personam jurisdiction.161 In these situations a federal 
district court given extended in personam jurisdiction by statute 
can provide the useful function of settling the entire case in a 
single lawsuit. The ALI study sought to deal with this prob- 
lem.'" If separate actions were filed in different federal districts 
or state courts, a combination of appropriate removal provisions, 
the transfer authority,16s and action by the multidistrict panellM 
could gather the suits into a single federal district. 
The contemporary role of diversity jurisdiction needs a 
comprehensive recanvassing. The American Law Institute study 
in 1968 made an excellent start.lS6 I t  attempted to identify situ- 
ations where a single state court, because of dispersed parties, 
cannot adjudicate an entire controversy. However, the study left 
intact much of the present diversity jurisdiction. Future efforts 
should seek to eliminate diversity jurisdiction unless there is a 
compelling, demonstrable, and useful purpose to be served by 
making available a federal trial court for purely state law cases. 
Under diversity jurisdiction, the substantive rights and in- 
terests involved are beyond the reach of congressional power; 
typically these cases are governed purely by state law. Yet there 
is no way for the state courts to review and correct erroneous 
150. 28 U.S.C. 8 1335 (1976). 
151. E.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
152. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN 
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS $8 2371-2376 (1963). 
153. 28 U.S.C. 5 1404(a) (1976). 
154. 28 U.S.C. 5 1407 (1976). 
155. See note 48 supra. 
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decisions in the federal courts. Additionally, Congress has no au- 
thority to deal with the substance of those decisions. Congres- 
sional authority comes into play only for the limited purpose of 
making available a federal trial forum. Thus, federal diversity 
jurisdiction can be restricted or eliminated without Congress' 
dealing with sensitive underlying substantive rights and inter- 
ests. The potential relief to the federal courts is substantial; in- 
volved are well over 34,000 district court cases annually, almost 
one-quarter of the entire civil docket of the district courts.lS6 
System- Wide Administration of the Federal Judiciary. At 
the national level the administration of the federal judiciary is 
fragmented; it lacks any single official charged with the responsi- 
bility of administering the system.16' The highest administrative 
authority is the Judicial Conference of the United States, a col- 
legial body consisting of twenty-four judges, which deals with 
administrative policies.lW Subordinate to it is the Administra- 
tive Office of the United States Courts, the judiciary's house- 
keeper, paymaster, and statistician.lm The Federal Judicial 
Center, which operates under its own board of directors, is the 
research and education arm of the judiciary.160 The Chief Justice 
of the United States chairs the Judicial Conference. In addition, 
he has come to perform a wide variety of administrative tasks, 
simply because there is no other official charged with these par- 
ticular responsibilities. These tasks, which cannot be performed 
by a collegial body or by administrative personnel who are not 
judges, must be performed by someone. 
One result is a serious overloading of the office of Chief Jus- 
tice. In addition to having the same judicial duties as the other 
eight justices, the Chief Justice is charged with presiding over 
the Supreme Court and all of its business. The responsibility is 
more than enough for one official. There is little time to perform 
system-wide administrative chores in addition to presiding over 
the Supreme Court. One of these jobs is likely to be slighted. As 
156. 1979 ANN. REP., note 5 supra. 
157. This problem and possible solutions to it are more fully discussed in Meador, 
The Federal Judiciary and Its Future Administration, 65 VA. L. REV. 1031 (1979). 
158. The Judicial Conference evolved from the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, 
which had been established in 1922 primarily to aid the Chief Justice in the effective use 
of his intercircuit assignment power. 28 U.S.C. 8 331 (1976). See P. FISH, THE POLITICS 
OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 34 (1973). 
159. See The Administrative Office Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-299, 53 Stat. 1223 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. $ 620 (1976)). 
160. 28 U.S.C. $5 611, 620-29 (1976). 
652 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I981 
the federal judiciary grows, this problem will worsen. 
There is need to create a single officer within the judiciary 
with sufficient status and authority to enable him to administer 
the system effectively on a day-to-day basis. There is more than 
one way to achieve this.lB1 A judicial officer could be appointed 
as an assistant to the Chief Justice to perform the administra- 
tive tasks. Alternatively, an administrative head could be desig- 
nated to perform this function, responsible directly to the Judi- 
cial Conference. An appropriate title for such a position might 
bc "Chancellor of the United States Courts." However such a 
new administrator is positioned and structured, he should have 
unambiguous authority to oversee the operations of the Admin- 
istrative Office and to perform system-wide administrative tasks 
presently being performed, out of institutional default, by the 
Chief Justice. Careful study is needed to determine how the new 
office can best be inserted near the top of the federal judiciary. 
Identification of the foregoing four problem areas is not in- 
tended to suggest that there are not numerous other matters 
needing prompt and serious attention. For example, the propo- 
sal to eliminate the Supreme Court's obligatory appellate juris- 
diction, now pending before Congress, should be enacted with- 
out delay. This idea has been studied for many years and is 
universally endorsed.lB2 It requires no further study, only con- 
gressional action. 
Other proposals currently pending before Congress should 
also be enacted. These include creation of advisory committees 
on rules of procedure and internal operations for the courts of 
appeals, alteration of the terms of chief judges, and creation of a 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and a U.S. Claims 
Court.le3 
In summary, the top four priorities for congressional action 
concerning the federal judiciary are: 
1. Intermediate appellate court restructuring; 
2. Non-Article I11 judicial officers and adjuncts; 
3. Availability of federal trial courts for the resolution of con- 
troversies governed by state law; 
161. The two suggestions contained in this paragraph are more fully developed in 
Meador, The Federal Judiciary and Its Future Administration, 65 VA. L. REV. 1031 
(1979). 
162. See note 92 supra. See also Gressman, Requiem for the Supreme Court's Obli- 
gatory Jurisdiction, 65 A.B.A.J. 1325 (1979). 
163. These proposals were all contained in S. 677 and S. 678, cited at note 94 supra. 
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4. System-wide administration of the federal judiciary. 
Any course of action adopted to deal with the federal judici- 
ary should have two objectives: first, the development of a set of 
proposals aimed at the priority problems of the federal courts, 
proposals that are also likely to enlist substantial support; sec- 
ond, the enactment of the proposals by the Congress. The 
achievement of those two objectives calls for, among other 
things, effective leadership, continuity of effort, the involvement 
of all three branches of the federal government, and the active 
participation of lawyers and key bar groups. 
The time is ripe for a fresh initiative. All of the work of the 
last dozen years has been useful, and perhaps even necessary, to 
pave the way toward some larger, more fundamental steps. Con- 
gressional increases in judicial personnel and the actions of the 
courts themselves in reshaping ways of managing and con- 
ducting business have put the entire federal judiciary in a new 
posture. Although these steps have worked improvements and 
have enabled the judiciary to deal better with its volume of busi- 
ness, basic problems remain and new problems have arisen. 
These problems can be tackled anew, in light of the perceptions 
gained from all the studies that have gone before and from the 
changes that have been wrought in the judiciary since the mid- 
1970's. With the present system now larger and different, we 
know more now than we knew then. 
The ingredients necessary for a successful effort might best 
be supplied in the form of a commission. A carefully constructed 
commission could, in a unique way, bring to bear on these 
problems the wisdom, ideas, and interests of the three branches 
of the federal government, the bar, the public, the researchers, 
and the scholars. Such a body should have a clearly identified 
mission and timetable. It should have sufficient resources and an 
adequate lifespan to enable it to develop the necessary propos- 
als, to enlist support behind them, and to see them through to 
congressional enactment. 
The timetable must be realistic. Experiences in the years 
before 1891 and since 1968 indicate that quick results are un- 
likely. Although the timetable should be such as to bring about 
results within a reasonable time, it must allow for the building 
of a consensus around the key proposals. The year 1989 provides 
a useful and symbolic target. It would allow eight years from the 
654 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I981 
present, a period which compares favorably with the eleven 
years consumed after 1880 in bringing about the Evarts Act. The 
job could be completed before the present decade is over, and 
1989 marks the 200th anniversary of the creation of the federal 
judiciary. The body charged with developing and promoting the 
significant judicial reforms might be called "The 1989 Commis- 
sion on the Federal Judiciary." 
Given the target date of 1989, this plan of action should fall 
into three phases. The first involves the establishment and or- 
ganization of the commission. With perseverance and luck this 
could be accomplished by the fall of 1982. Once organized, the 
commission's initial task would be to develop proposals to deal 
with the priority problems outlined above. This would involve a 
survey of all available ideas in the literature and existing studies 
and reports. In addition, submission of new ideas and fresh data 
should be widely encouraged. Two years should be allotted to 
this phase. Thus by the end of 1984, proposals should be ready 
for introduction in Congress. 
The last phase of the plan involves the efforts necessary to 
bring about congressional enactment of the proposals. Under the 
suggested timetable, bills embodying the proposals would be in- 
troduced at the beginning of the 99th Congress, convening in 
January 1985. That timing is particularly advantageous since the 
introduction of the proposals would coincide with the beginning 
of a new presidential term, thus allowing four years and two 
Congresses for their consideration, free of the distorting interfer- 
ences of a presidential election. Experience suggests that two 
Congresses are usually necessary for the enactment of most new 
measures; dispersion of congressional attention, the building of 
the necessary political support, and the hearing processes in two 
Houses make it difficult to bring a bill from introduction to en- 
actment within the two-year span of a single Congress. If this 
timetable is adhered to, the proposals would be enacted by the 
close of the 100th Congress and become effective not later than 
1989, the 200th anniversary of the federal judiciary and of the 
ratification of the Constitution. 
An important part of the commission's work would involve 
the building of support for its proposals. Proposals without a re- 
alistic chance of political acceptance are pointless. The building 
of support would start during the two-year period when the pro- 
posals are under development. The process of development 
would involve bringing in persons and groups across the country, 
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enlisting their interest and ideas, and hence, ultimate support 
for the resulting product. Once the proposals were introduced 
into Congress, the commission would concentrate on stimulating 
the kinds of political support that typically are lacking in judi- 
cial reform efforts. This would involve liaison with state and lo- 
cal bar groups, collaboration with congressional committees in 
developing hearings, and a general educational effort through 
the news media to stimulate public support for the measures. 
The commission would, of course, require adequate financial 
support. An able, full-time director would be necessary, assisted 
by perhaps two professionals and two secretarialhlerical per- 
sons. Funds also would be necessary for office expenses and the 
expenses of commission members in attending meetings. A total 
of approximately two million dollars should be sufficient for the 
commission to carry out the entire plan. 
How should "The 1989 Commission" be established? There 
are three possibilities: congressional action, presidential action, 
and private, nongovernmental action. 
Congress could establish such a commission, just as it estab- 
lished the Hruska Commission. In several respects this would 
perhaps be the best process. A statutory enactment could bring 
to the commission key persons from all branches and ensure, 
more effectively than other means, their serious attention to the 
subject. Adequate funding could be provided. Since the enter- 
prise would have been given an initial congressional blessing, the 
proposals subsequently recommended by the commission might 
be treated more seriously by Congress. 
A disadvantage of attempting to secure congressional crea- 
tion of the commission is that this effort in itself could become a 
major undertaking consuming several years. Moreover, as is il- 
lustrated by the nonaction in the six years since the submission 
of the Hruska Commission report, there is no guarantee that a 
congressionally created commission will move Congress to act. If, 
however, key members of the House and Senate Judiciary Com- 
mittees are interested in the idea and are disposed to move 
promptly, this route should be pursued. 
A more expeditious means of bringing the commission into 
being might be a presidential executive order. The moment is 
opportune for the launching of such a presidential initiative. A 
new President took office in January 1981. As with any new ad- 
ministration, there likely will be interest in new programs and 
fresh starts on numerous fronts, with an opportunity to include 
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judicial reform on the agenda. There will be no better time for 
at least another four years to obtain presidential backing for 
such a significant step on behalf of the courts. 
Assuming that the President would agree to the creation of 
such a commission, the next crucial step would be to obtain the 
cooperation and support of key people from the other two 
branches of government. Contacts should be made on behalf of 
the President with the chairmen and ranking minority members 
of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees and perhaps 
with other members of those committees. Similar contacts 
should be made with the Chief Justice. These contacts should be 
made to obtain the cooperation and support of these officials in 
the judicial and legislative branches. Every effort should be 
made by the administration to deal with the problem in a bipar- 
tisan way, sharing responsibility and involvement with the other 
two branches of the government and with key members of the 
major political parties. The interbranch seminars on the federal 
judiciary, held for the last four years, should facilitate such com- 
munication on court problems.lM 
One way to obtain bipartisan involvement of the other gov- 
ernmental branches would be to ask the chairmen and ranking 
minority members of the two Judiciary Committees to designate 
persons to sit on the commission and likewise to ask the Judicial 
Conference and the Chief Justice to designate members. The 
President would, of course, designate members also. The result- 
ing commission would thereby reflect the interests and concerns 
of all three branches of the government. 
In the absence of action by Congress or the President, the 
enterprise might still be launched through the initiative of indi- 
viduals and nongovernmental institutions. The first step would 
be to secure adequate funding over a period of years. The 
sources for such funding would be private foundations. But who 
would seek such funding? The task could be undertaken by 
some existing organization such as an educational institution or 
an independent research entity. Alternatively, a few well-organ- 
ized individuals might take the initiative to secure the necessary 
funding, although the supporting foundations might require that 
the funds be vested in an existing entity in which the founda- 
164. For a description of these seminars, under the aegis of the Brookings Institu- 
tion, see Cannon & Cikins, Interbranch Cooperation in Improving the Administration of 
Justice: A Major Innovation, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (1981). 
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tions have confidence. While this initial step would not be easy, 
given sufficient interest and determination by at least some in- 
fluential individuals or organizations, it is not insuperable. 
Whatever the means of bringing the commission into being, 
its composition should reflect the perspectives, ideas, and inter- 
ests of the three branches of the federal government, various 
segments of the bar, and students of the judiciary. To achieve 
this, the commission should consist of members of the Congress, 
the judiciary, and the executive branch. If such officials them- 
selves are not available to serve, or prefer not to serve, persons 
designated by them should be included on the commission. In- 
deed, in some instances, designees of the officials would be pref- 
erable to the officials themselves in that such persons could 
devote more time to the commission's work and could function 
free of awkward or possibly conflicting political considerations. 
A body of approximately twenty members should be large 
enough to accommodate all of the desired perspectives and in- 
terests yet small enough to work collegially and effectively. 
The following is a list of the officials and institutions, gov- 
ernmental bodies, nongovernmental groups, and other groups 
that should be represented on the commission, with a suggested 
number of persons in each category: 
-the chairmen and ranking minority members of the Senate 
and House Judiciary Committees (four persons); 
-the Attorney General of the United States (one person); 
-the Chief Justice of the United States (one person); 
-the Judicial Conference of the United States (two persons); 
-the Director of the Federal Judicial Center (one person); 
-the Director of the National Center for State Courts (one 
person); 
-the Conference of Chief Justices (two persons); 
-each of the major national organizations concerned with law 
and the courts, including the American Bar Association, the 
American Judicature Society, the National Bar Association, 
the National Association of Women Lawyers, and perhaps 
others (one person each); 
-the academic world, including law professors knowledgeable 
about the federal judiciary (two or three persons). 
In addition, the group should include one person experienced in 
management and organization of large, complex enterprises. 
The twelve years of study and effort that have gone by will 
not be wasted if we build upon that work and move on with a 
658 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I981 
coherent plan of action. Determined, positive, and prompt steps 
must be taken, however. With no powerful constituency, with no 
identified leader in the political arena committed to the cause, 
and with no public demand, action is unlikely unless individuals 
in public and private life who are concerned with the problems 
of the federal judiciary band together as a catalytic force. The 
number need not be large, but it must include persons of influ- 
ence respected in law and government. The primary mission of 
this group would be to bring into being the kind of commission 
described above, which in turn would be charged with getting 
the job done not later than 1989. Putting the federal judiciary in 
a position to perform its mission effectively under Article 111 of 
the Constitution would be the best possible celebration of its 
200th anniversary. 
